one nation

Why One Nation Will Also Disappoint Voters in Australia

Picture a couple in an outer-suburban brick veneer: Two kids, two cars, one mortgage that has climbed by about $500 a month since February, because the Reserve Bank has lifted the cash rate five times this year to 4.85 per cent. He works in logistics. She does three days a week at a childcare centre, which is the only reason the second car still makes sense.

Some Saturday soon (a state election, a by-election, one day a federal election) they will do something neither of them has done before, and put One Nation first on the ballot paper.

They are not stupid and they are not hateful. They have spent years watching the people who run the country explain why nothing could be done, and then they heard a woman say that something could. She said it plainly. She said it again the next week. After a decade of managed vagueness, that counts for a great deal.

On the Monday, nothing will have changed. The interest rate decision is not on any ballot. The planning rules in their council area will be exactly what they were on Friday. The transmission line that will add to their power bill will still be waiting for an approval, and the people who approve it will be exactly as slow.

They have the symptom right. It is the lever they have been handed that is wrong.

What the Vote Is Made Of

The numbers first, because they are real.

In the latest Newspoll, taken between 26 and 29 October, One Nation sat on 28 per cent of the primary vote, ahead of Labor on 27 and the Coalition on 21. At the 2025 federal election it polled 6.4 per cent. Since then it has won three Legislative Council seats and four lower house seats in South Australia, finished second in the Nepean by-election in Victoria, and in May took Farrer, a seat the Coalition had held for 77 years. David Farley won about 39 per cent of the primary vote there, a swing of nearly 33 points, and about 57 per cent after preferences.

The polls do wobble. One Resolve poll had One Nation down three points to 26 per cent and some analysts asked whether it had peaked. The next Newspoll put it back at 28.

Who is switching? One analysis of the polling puts roughly 30 per cent of 2025 Liberal voters, but only about 10 per cent of 2025 Labor voters, in One Nation's column. May polling analysed by the East Asia Forum found the surge was overwhelmingly driven by ideologically conservative Liberal and National voters, and that One Nation supporters were no more likely than anyone else to rank the cost of living or economic management first. Sixty-two per cent of them put immigration in their top three issues. Only 28 per cent put it first.

Then ask them why. In July, Redbridge and Accent polled 1,987 voters and asked One Nation supporters for their main reason. Anti-establishment feeling accounted for 32 per cent (a mood for change, and disgust at the major parties, 16 per cent each). Pauline Hanson herself, her authenticity and shared values, accounted for 26 per cent. Immigration drew 11 per cent, "Australia-first nationalism" 11 per cent. The cost of living drew 2 per cent.

Former Labor voters said the government was performing badly (21 per cent) and had broken promises (13 per cent), the May budget's tax promises in particular. Former Coalition voters said the country was heading in the wrong direction (17 per cent), and that the Coalition was too similar to Labor (13 per cent) and too divided (13 per cent).

When researchers sit down with the switchers for long interviews, the story gets tidier. Civic Vista's Sam Palmer spoke to ten former Liberal and ten former Labor voters, and they described, in near-identical language, immigration driving the housing crisis, which drives the cost-of-living crisis. Crikey's seven voters added small business red tape, payday super, energy prices they blame on renewables, and an anger at being lectured on national identity. One of them said, "I didn't change. Labor did."

Put it together and the shape is clear. This is not mainly a policy vote. It is a vote against something, wearing a policy as a coat. I call it an expressive vote. You cast it to say something, and it is satisfied the moment it is cast. A program has to be satisfied by results, which is a much harder test, and an expressive vote has no way to tell the difference until the results fail to arrive.

What One Nation Wants to Do, But...

Here is the platform as the voters understand it, one plank at a time, and what each plank runs into.

Immigration. One Nation wants to cap net overseas migration at 130,000 a year, reaching it by running migration net-negative for three years and cutting more than 750,000 temporary visas. But housing is built by people, and business groups warned the cut would land on construction, aged care, disability services, hospitality and farming. A cap that shrinks the buyers and the builders in one motion has pulled the demand lever and jammed the supply lever together. And it is a number, which means it becomes a target, which means (Goodhart again) departments will find ways to hit it on the spreadsheet.

Energy. It wants to repeal net zero, end renewables support, build coal, lift the nuclear ban, ban offshore wind, quit Paris and scrap the climate department. But wholesale electricity prices fell by an average of 47 per cent across the National Electricity Market in the June quarter, and the part of the bill that is climbing is the poles and wires, about 40 per cent of it. Repealing a target does not change who pays for a transmission line. The real reasons power is dearer than a coal-and-gas country should expect, get their own section below, and they are not the ones on the placard.

Housing. It wants to ban foreign ownership of residential property (temporary visa holders and non-residents get two years to sell), limit negative gearing on large portfolios and put a GST moratorium on building materials. But the Productivity Commission names planning and zoning, and a 12 per cent fall in construction productivity over thirty years, as the barriers to supply. Those levers sit with state governments and councils. A federal party on 28 per cent can announce things. It cannot rezone a single street.

Spending. It wants to cut "wasteful" spending, audit the NDIS and investigate childcare, because spending is feeding inflation. But the Coalition is circling the same three programs, so this is not what separates One Nation from anyone. And an audit finds fraud. It does not change how a program is designed, which is where the money actually goes. More on that below.

Identity. It wants to ban Welcome to Country in departments and schools and, in Hanson's words at the Press Club, return to a "monocultural" Australia. But this has nothing to do with the mortgage. It is a separate promise that can be kept or broken independently, and it bundles a legitimate concern with a maximal remedy. That concern deserves a proper hearing, so it gets one next.

The Cost on the Other Side of the Ledger

The economic argument is the only one, because it is not, and the people who pretend it is are doing the other side's work for them.

High migration has a socio-cultural cost, and it is not nothing. Every society has a rate at which it can absorb newcomers and still be recognisably itself. Above that rate, trust thins, neighbourhoods turn over faster than relationships can form, and the shared assumptions that let strangers cooperate (the queue, the contract, the idea that you can disagree with a man and still not hit him) get stretched. The stress is real, and it is larger where the arriving culture sits further from the liberal, English-common-law settlement the country was built on and is not sympathetic to it. Saying so is not bigotry. It is the same arithmetic about absorption that we accept without argument when it is about housing or hospital beds.

The people who feel this are not imagining it. When a long-settled community says it is losing something, that is data, and the answer "you are just racist" has handed One Nation a good deal of its audience (I believe).

But the rhetoric around it obscures the cost, in both directions. One side treats any mention of cultural stress as a moral failing and goes quiet. The other turns it into a slogan (a "monocultural" Australia) and sells it as a remedy. A slogan is not a policy, and the opportunists who sell it have not priced all the trade-offs. Migrants staff aged care and construction. They offset an ageing workforce. And the people already here, many of them citizens, would hear the slogan as aimed at them. A policy that works on the pace and the selection of intake, and on how well people settle, might address the real cost. A policy that gestures at a past that cannot be restored will not.

The best evidence also complicates my own point, and I would rather say so than have you find it. The Scanlon Foundation's 2025 survey found 51 per cent of Australians say the immigration rate is too high, the highest since the survey began in 2007. It also found 83 per cent say multiculturalism has been good for the country, and 60 per cent agree immigrants increase house prices. In 2024 the lead author, ANU's James O'Donnell, said the view that immigration is too high is driven by economic and housing concerns, not by opposition to diversity. The same research reports persistent prejudice towards some immigrants and faith groups, and the lowest sense of belonging among the young, the poor and those from non-English-speaking backgrounds.

So there are two stresses and they are tangled. One is housing and cost, which the polls say dominates. The other is cultural, which the polls say is smaller than the rhetoric but which is real in particular places and for particular groups. A party that fixes neither the supply of homes nor the pace of settlement, and offers a slogan in place of both, has not addressed either one.

A Country Is Not a Watch

I have argued before that a watch is complicated and a society is complex. If you replace a broken cog, the watch resumes ticking. A society is millions of people who respond to whatever you do, usually in ways nobody modelled. Governments seldom learn this, and insurgents never do, because for an insurgent the lever is the whole product.

The Productivity Commission has been telling governments for years that first-home buyer incentives worth nearly $3 billion risk driving up prices, and has recommended phasing them out. Voters wanted help, governments pulled the obvious lever, and the lever fed the fire. That is the Delhi cobra bounty, moved to the housing market.

One Nation's version is the mirror image. If housing is dear because there is too much demand, cut the demand. The logic is clean, and the demand is real. Net overseas migration was 76 per cent of Australia's population growth in the year to December 2024, according to AMP's analysis of the ABS figures. But the lever does something else on its way through, as above, and the business groups called the 130,000 figure arbitrary.

There was a small sign of how this goes. After the Farrer win, the new member told the press that national migration levels could stay close to, or even above, Labor's forecasts, which contradicted his own party's stated policy, and Hanson, Barnaby Joyce and James Ashby had to clean it up. Every new party fumbles early. I mention it because immigration is the one plank the whole project stands on.

Housing: The Constraint Is Not Where the Microphone Is

Danielle Wood, the Productivity Commission's chair, names two barriers to housing supply. One is planning and zoning, which limit what can be built and where. The other is that construction productivity has fallen 12 per cent over thirty years, even after adjusting for bigger and better homes. She has also said that fixes will take decades to filter through to affordability. The Albanese government's target of 1.2 million homes is running roughly a quarter behind. A NSW commission has estimated that building 10 per cent more homes than population growth requires would cut housing costs by 25 per cent. Treat that as an estimate, not a law, but it tells you which way the arrow points.

I call this the microphone problem. Political attention goes where the microphones are, and the microphones are at immigration, because immigration has a number, a villain and a press conference. The binding constraint sits where there are no microphones at all: a council planning meeting on a wet Thursday night with eleven people in the room and no cameras.

One Nation's housing platform does include supply measures: the GST moratorium, funding for apprentice wages, and collaboration with councils on zoning. They are the least publicised parts. The headline is the foreign-ownership ban and the migration cap. In June, several party figures, Joyce among them, gave different accounts of how the foreign-ownership ban would work, and Hanson had to confirm that permanent residents would be free to own homes.

Energy: What Are We Doing Wrong?

Here is the question I cannot let go of. Australia sits on enormous coal and gas. A country with that endowment should have energy that is close to free and abundant. It does not. So what are we doing wrong?

The answer is not the one either camp sells. We did three things, and none of them is ideological.

We let our gas be priced by someone else. Since 2015, wholesale gas prices on the east coast have been linked to LNG export prices through what is called a netback price (the export price minus the cost of liquefying and shipping the gas). The three Queensland export projects now account for almost three-quarters of east coast gas demand, according to the RBA. Gas is also commonly argued to be the marginal producer that sets the wholesale electricity price. So a Sydney household pays a price anchored to what a Japanese buyer would pay, less the cost of shipping it, for gas produced in its own country. Western Australia reserves a share of its gas for domestic use, and analysts disagree about how much good that has done, but it is a policy choice and the east coast did not make it. The Commonwealth announced a domestic gas reservation scheme in May 2026, and Peter Dutton's Coalition took a reservation plan to the 2025 election.

New coal is not the old coal. The existing fleet is cheap to run because it was built and paid for decades ago. It is also ageing and closing. A new station has to be financed and built at today's prices. CSIRO's GenCost 2025-26 report, as summarised by the Clean Energy Council (an advocate, so check the original), puts new black coal at $121 to $195 per MWh and gas at $135 to $203, against $52 to $88 for solar and $78 to $129 for onshore wind. CSIRO's own line is that new coal can be cost-competitive with renewables, but using it would need dearer carbon abatement elsewhere in the economy to reach net zero. The same report says prices will rise towards $125 per MWh after 2030 as coal retires, with or without net zero. So building coal does not return us to free. It replaces an old cheap thing with a new expensive one. (That is the claim, and there is an argument about the modelling, and I am not the person to settle it.

Fuel is not most of the bill. The poles and wires are about 40 per cent, and they cost the same whatever is burning at the other end. Transmission project costs are up as much as 55 per cent on AEMO's estimates, driven by approvals, community opposition and construction blowouts.

My own view on the rest is simple, and I hold it as a libertarian. I would let sustainable energy earn its place in the sub-sectors where it has a genuine advantage (a remote property, a rooftop, a firmed grid slice at the right time of day) instead of enforcing it and subsidising it everywhere. Australia is small, and our emissions are a rounding error in the world's, so the case for paying a premium to make a gesture is thin. But the same rule must apply to coal. If new coal is as cheap as its supporters say, it needs no subsidy and no guarantee, because someone will build it and make money. If it is not, no minister should be buying it for them. Level the field and let the arithmetic decide.

Notice too that this is not where One Nation differs from the pack. RenewEconomy reports that Angus Taylor's Budget reply, with its scrapping of net zero, more coal and gas, and nuclear, is now almost indistinguishable from One Nation's energy position. When the Coalition has moved onto your ground, the ground is not what separates you. The voice is.

Inflation and the NDIS

The Reserve Bank lifted the cash rate to 4.85 per cent on 3 November, its fifth rise of 2026 and the highest in 18 years. Inflation rose to 4.3 per cent in September. The board split six to three. Economists point to the Middle East conflict and fuel prices, and also to high government spending. Chalmers says budgets are not the primary driver of prices. Nationals leader Matt Canavan says the problem is clearly too much government spending.

Hanson's first 100 days would cut "wasteful" spending, audit the NDIS and investigate childcare. The Coalition has said it would cut spending on the NDIS, aged care and childcare. So both right-of-centre parties are circling the same three programs.

It is tempting to say the NDIS is a program where the person paying is not the person using. That is too crude. The NDIS is built on individual plans. The participant gets a budget, chooses their providers and decides how to spend it, and has three ways to manage the money: the agency pays on their behalf, a plan manager pays, or they pay providers themselves. So in design it is the closest thing Australia has to funding the user.

But look at what is missing. The participant is choosing, and the Commonwealth is paying. Registered providers cannot charge above the NDIA's published price limits, and a self-manager can pay more than the limit as long as the total stays inside the plan. And what goes into the plan is whatever a planner decides is "reasonable and necessary". So the user has the choice, and nobody in the system has the incentive to ask whether a dollar is worth spending. That is not a market. It is a catalogue with a government credit card, and a catalogue with a credit card tends to grow.

An audit can find fraud inside that arrangement, and it should. It cannot change the arrangement. Choice without a price signal is half of the idea I made in the clerks piece (fund the user), and the half that is missing is the half that holds costs down.

No Cabal, Just a Filing Cabinet

You will hear people on the right call this the deep state, and I have been told I should say it too.

If by deep state you mean a secret cabal, I have no evidence for one and neither do you. If you mean a permanent class of officials whose incentives outlast any election, I can show you the paperwork.

As an aside - backed by the gravitas of a thousand podcast clips and zero research - I do not believe a small group of people could pull this off. A conspiracy needs competence, and competence at that scale is the rarest thing in any organisation. What I believe in is a filing cabinet.

Consider Robodebt. The royal commission heard that public servants across the two departments overseeing the scheme were repeatedly warned it was unlawful and had numerous opportunities to stop it. A later review found twelve public servants had breached the Public Service Code of Conduct 97 times. The National Anti-Corruption Commission found two of them had engaged in serious corrupt conduct, although, as one analysis put it, they were not likely to be criminally prosecuted. The scheme ran under a Coalition government and was examined by a royal commission under a Labor one, which tells you the incentive is not partisan. The pattern, on my reading, is the blame gradient at work: each level had every reason to pass the problem upward and none to be the person who stopped it.

That is not a plot. A plot would have been tidier. What we have is a lot of people responding sensibly to the incentives in front of them and producing, between them, an outcome nobody chose and nobody would own. Nobody ever got fired for following the protocol, and a minister who stands at the dispatch box and says "errors will happen" gets executed by breakfast. So the rules ratchet. The beneficiaries of compliance are concentrated and organised. The victims are diffuse and tired.

Now picture a One Nation minister walking into a department in 2028. The 100-day plan includes dismantling the climate department. A department is a building and a letterhead. The function, the career incentives and the blame gradient move to another desk in another building and carry on. Pournelle's Iron Law says the people who work for the organisation, rather than for its goals, eventually control it. Abolishing a label does not touch the law.

And the machinery does not even respond to its own side's levers. Labor came to government promising to cut reliance on consultants and contractors. The government says it has created more than 11,800 public service roles to replace outsourced work, and a 2021-22 audit found 53,900 full-time-equivalent staff in outsourced arrangements. Critics note that the headcount has grown by about 24 per cent to more than 213,000 under Labor, and reporting found federal IT contractor spend tripled despite the policy aim, while ICT headcount in the public service rose by about 45 per cent. I do not know who is right about whether the trade was worth it. I do know that pulling the lever, in either direction, did not give anyone what they thought they were buying.

The Party That Has to Do It

One Nation has one structural problem its voters rarely mention: it has to be competent at the unglamorous parts.

In 1998 it won about 23 per cent of the Queensland vote and 11 seats in a party that had not existed 18 months earlier. Within a year the MPs were quitting and fighting, and in 1999 the Queensland Supreme Court ruled that the party had been fraudulently registered there. ABC election analyst Antony Green has catalogued what happened to the party's elected MPs, and the headline finding is that it has a history of losing them. It was also hamstrung by the major parties agreeing to preference it last.

This time - thirty years later - there are differences. It has a former Nationals leader, Barnaby Joyce, in the lower house. It says it has vetted more than 1,200 potential candidates and will run in every Victorian lower house seat. It has put its positions on the record at the National Press Club. Those are signs of a party trying to grow up. And the Liberals preferenced Farley over the independent in Farrer, roughly 60 per cent of Coalition preferences going his way, which is how a protest vote becomes a seat.

But there are also the reports of internal worry over Farley's loyalty before the by-election, the vetting controversies that have followed the party's polling rise, and the observation, from a commentator sympathetic to the right, that the party has shifting positions and announcements but no evidence yet of the sustained policy work, internal discipline or institutional weight needed to govern. And Australia is a federation. A national party without state organisations, candidates and parliamentary presence in the states cannot move the levers that matter most, which, as we have seen, are mostly state levers.

I should not overstate this. A party that has to learn on the job is a normal thing. The deeper problem is not competence. It is that the platform contains no feedback loop, so no amount of competence turns it into one.

What a Proper Solution Looks Like

If the system is complex, the solution is not a better lever. It is a set of arrangements that make the system correct itself. These are design sketches, untested, and I offer them as the kind of thing the problem needs, not as a manifesto, because a manifesto is exactly what I have just argued against.

Housing: pay the people who say yes. Planning approvals are where the supply constraint sits, so change who gains from approval. Make development as-of-right in pre-zoned areas, tie infrastructure funding to dwellings approved, and reward councils for each home that is built rather than leaving them to absorb the complaints. Run it as a reversible experiment in two states first. The Productivity Commission has already recommended firm supply targets, planning reform and an end to first-home buyer grants.

Migration: a governor, not a number. Use a feedback rule instead of a fixed cap. Set intake each year against measured housing completions and rental vacancy, so the system tightens when homes are scarce and loosens when they are not. Add a harder second dial for the cultural cost: how well the last cohort has settled, measured by language, work and belonging, so that intake responds to absorption as well as to bricks. A governor does not care what the number is. It cares what the number does.

Energy: fix the gas price, then level the field. Reserve enough domestic gas that the east coast is not paying export parity for its own resource. Treat network cost and approval speed as the target, with landholder compensation and community co-ownership so the people living next to a line have a reason to want it. Then remove both the mandates and the thumb on the scale. No subsidy for the renewable and no guarantee for the coal. Whatever survives a fair contest, builds.

The NDIS and its relatives: give the user a reason to care about price. The design already has the choice. The missing piece is a signal. One option is to let self-managing participants keep a share of what they save inside their plan and spend it on other supports. That could be dangerous for people who cannot judge quality, so it would need to be optional and trialled, but it is the right shape: the person who decides is also the person who gains from prudence. I have not checked how childcare and aged care are funded and would not apply this to them without doing so.

The ratchet: build a way to retire laws. We have machinery for passing laws and almost none for retiring them. Each new rule is a one-way valve. The Legislation Act 2003 does have a sunsetting regime: most legislative instruments (the regulations and rules underneath Acts) are repealed automatically ten years after registration, on 1 April or 1 October, unless they are remade. The Attorney-General can defer a date by up to two years, and dates can be lined up for a thematic review of a whole group of instruments. It is a small mechanism and it only reaches the level below Acts of Parliament. Extend the idea upward.

Three pieces. First, a standing legislative review that sweeps the stock of existing law, starting with the classes that impose compliance on private parties, and brings back repeal proposals in a single package. A single package matters because it beats the blame gradient: no minister has to defend the repeal of any one law, only the vote on the bundle. (The US base closure commissions used this trick to close military bases nobody would vote to close one at a time.) Second, automatic sunset for defined classes of primary legislation, such as program acts and compliance regimes, after ten years unless Parliament re-enacts them with a published statement of what the law has achieved. Third, a statutory safe harbour for good-faith professional discretion, which is the only thing that makes omission as visible as commission.

Two cautions, because Chesterton's fence applies to this as much as to anything. A good law can lapse by calendar accident, so core law should get review and a presumption of renewal, not automatic death. And a sunset that is rubber-stamped every ten years is a ritual, not a reform. The point is to force the question once a decade and to give Parliament back some of its own time. I have not found evidence on how well the instrument-level regime actually works, and would want that before pushing it further.

Now compare the lists. One Nation's platform is subtractive: cap, ban, repeal, dismantle. The solutions above are structural: incentives, rules and feedback. That is the whole difference, and it is not a difference of ideology. A left-wing party that capped rents and a right-wing party that capped migration are both pulling a lever, and both will be surprised.

The Best Case Against

If I were arguing against myself, I would start here.

The voters' diagnosis is not wrong. Migration does feed demand, it does carry a cultural cost, and it is a policy lever that governments can pull. The major parties have noticed. Labor is working towards 225,000 net overseas migration over two years, and the Coalition's housing-linked figure is about 170,000. If you measure One Nation by whether it moved the debate, it has already won something. When I say its impact will be limited, I mean its ability to fix the underlying causes. Its ability to reshape the political map, in Parliament and in the Coalition, may be considerable.

The party is also professionalising, and the 1998 comparison may not hold. It has a lower house seat, an experienced former Nationals leader, a nationwide candidate pipeline, and a leader who has outlasted everyone who wrote her off. A new party that learns quickly is a different animal from the one that fell apart in 1999.

On energy, the voters' anger is not irrational either. Network costs are climbing, bills have not fallen the way they were promised, and the Middle East conflict has made energy security feel like more than a slogan. My own preference for letting renewables earn their way is a minority view among the modellers, who mostly report that firmed solar and wind are now the cheapest new build, and some argue that Australia cannot ignore carbon rules in the markets it sells to. I do not have the data to settle that, and the GenCost modelling is itself argued over. But if the modellers are right, a fair contest would produce a lot of renewables without subsidy, and my position and theirs end up closer than the shouting suggests. And the systems critique cuts both ways. Labor and the Coalition have also treated the country as a watch, and I have no interest in defending either.

Finally, this is a prediction. Polls move, the Victorian election has not yet happened, preferential voting means Labor could still win comfortably even with One Nation in front on first preferences, and I have been wrong before. What I am confident about is narrower: the causes of the couple's squeeze sit mostly in places One Nation's platform does not reach, so the squeeze will probably still be there when the novelty has worn off.

Back to the Kitchen Table

On the Monday, the couple will check the mortgage app. The number will be the same.

They will be told to be patient, which is what they were told by the last lot. Some of them will believe it for a year. Some will decide that the new lot were also not the real thing, and go looking for a third. And somewhere across town a council planner with eleven people in the room will approve nothing, on time, with a perfectly kept file.

That is the thing I would like them to see, and it is not a comfortable thing, and it is not Hanson's fault. You cannot vote a complex system out of a corner. You can only change who gets paid when it works.

Next time somebody offers you a lever, ask what it is connected to.

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